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Despite repeated calls for reform, the UN Security Council has as yet resisted to satisfy the demands of a group of rising pow-
ers – Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (G4) – for a permanent seat. We focus on one strategy of institutional adaptation to
power shifts mentioned in the introductory article to this special issue and examine why the G4’s rhetorical coercion strategy
has failed to resonate with the Council’s permanent members and the wider UN membership. Looking at the key debate on
Security Council reform in the General Assembly in 2005, we examine the justifications the G4 have offered to support their
proposal and whether these have been accepted as legitimate by UN member states. We show that the G4’s rhetorical coer-
cion strategy has failed to resonate with the targeted audience because the G4 have justified their demand strongly in terms
of how their material contributions would enhance the UN’s performance. In contrast, the G4’s opponents provided justifica-
tions predominantly based on fair and democratic procedures, generating higher levels of expressed support. The importance
of procedural fairness is consistent with findings in social psychology and challenges the prominent argument that perfor-
mance is the main path to legitimacy for international institutions.
Policy Implications
• States seeking institutional reform cannot just state their demands, they need to justify why their demands are legitimate.
For these justifications to resonate with the targeted audience and, in particular, with veto players who can thwart their
reform attempts, states must appeal to widely accepted norms.
• Improving the performance matters for the legitimacy of international institutions, but member states place as much, if
not more, value on procedural fairness. Hence, states that strive for institutional reform cannot just point to resulting
increases in the institutions’ performance. They must be able to appeal to gains in procedural fairness that result from
their proposed reforms.
• Investing political capital and resources in a campaign for institutional reforms at the UN Security Council that cannot be
justified with a view to enhancing procedural fairness does not pay off for states. Not only does it deflect attention from
other pressing issues that need to be addressed at the UN, but states that do so also risk alienating states whose support
they need for other initiatives at the UN or elsewhere.
Introduction
There is near-universal agreement among United Nations
member states that the Security Council needs to adapt to
the changes in word politics that have occurred since the
creation of the UN.1. The permanent membership and veto
right for a small group of states that derive their privileges
from the power constellation at the end of World War II are
perceived to be particularly anachronistic. Scholars even
point to a norm of Security Council reform in that no state
can publicly reject the need for reform (Schaefer, 2017). And
yet, all efforts to reform the Council have failed to garner
the necessary support of the Council’s five permanent mem-
bers (P5) and two thirds of the wider UN membership. In
2005, in the wake of the UN World Summit, Brazil, Germany,
India and Japan (the G4) have launched the most promising
reform initiative since the General Assembly (GA) had set up
an open-ended working group on the matter in 1993. How-
ever, their proposed plan for reform, which would have
given them permanent seats in the Council and thus influ-
ence and status (Ward, 2017), failed to receive sufficient
backing. On the contrary, the G4’s opponents came forward
with competing reform proposals to frustrate the G4’s
demands.
The Introduction to this special issue (Kruck and Zangl,
this issue) proposes four strategies of institutional adapta-
tion to power shifts: power bargaining, strategic cooptation,
rhetorical coercion, and principled persuasion. We focus on
one of these strategies – rhetorical coercion (see also Fiore-
tos, this issue; Goddard, this issue; MacDonald, this issue) –
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to shed light on the G4’s failure to provide compelling justi-
fications for their reform initiative.
Our paper makes two important contributions. First,
because the G4 lack outside options (power bargaining) and
sufficient material resources they can trade in for reform
(strategic cooptation), rhetorical coercion is an important
strategy for the G4 that has not been examined in the con-
text of Security Council reform so far. Rhetorical coercion
occurs when a ‘claimant’s opponents have been talked into
a corner, compelled to endorse a stance, they would other-
wise reject’ (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, p. 36). In the context
of institutional adaptation, negotiating parties – challengers
and preservers of an institutional status quo – publicly
exchange arguments about the legitimacy of the status quo
and the proposed reform to mobilize support. If rhetorical
coercion succeeds and the justifications resonate with the
target audience, the space for contestation is narrowed
down to the extent that counter-narratives are no longer
feasible. One party to the debate is rhetorically outmaneu-
vered and must consent to the other party’s claims (Krebs
and Jackson, 2007; Schimmelfennig, 2001). Second, we lack
a clear understanding of the conditions under which rhetori-
cal coercion is successful in the context of institutional
adaption. We therefore build on several strands of literature
in political science and social psychology to examine which
justifications resonate with the target audience and why.
The argument we propose is that the G4 failed to put for-
ward justifications that sufficiently resonated with the target
audience and, as such, failed to devise an effective rhetorical
coercion strategy. We show that the G4 have put strong
legitimatory emphasis on how their economic and political
weight and their material contributions would enhance the
Council’s performance in addressing international security
threats as well as compliance with Council decisions. How-
ever, the G4’s performance-based justifications did not win
sufficient support and failed to close off routes for their riv-
als to reject them rhetorically. By contrast, justifications
based on fairer procedures that the opponents of the G4
have used to justify their rejection of the G4 proposal –
accountability, participation, representation of developing
states – generated much higher levels of expressed support
among UN member states. The importance states publicly
attach to fair and democratic procedures is consistent with
accounts pointing to an increasing salience of democratic
governance norms. It is also in line with research in social
psychology that highlights the value individuals ascribe to
fair decision-making procedures. We explore the plausibility
of this argument with data collected in the 2005 UNGA
debate on the G4 proposal for Security Council reform. We
have chosen the 2005 debate because in the run-up to the
UN world summit in the same year an important – perhaps
even unique (Stedman, 2007) – window of opportunity
opened for the G4. In addition to that, the debate allows us
to examine not just the justificatory claims of the G4 but
also whether they resonated with the targeted audience
(the P5 and the wider UN membership).
Our aim is not to explain why the reform proposed by
the G4 failed. We do not claim that the reform fell through
because the G4’s rhetorical coercion strategy was mis-
guided. Nor do we seek to assess the explanatory power of
the G4’s ill-fated rhetorical coercion strategy relative to
other potential explanations for the failure of Security Coun-
cil reform, such as the high decision-making threshold for
Charter amendments (Hosli and D€orfler, 2019), the G4’s lack
of outside options (Zangl et al., 2016; Lipscy, 2017), or the
G4’s inability to provide convincing normative arguments or
material incentives to their regional competitors (Schirm,
2010). We believe that rhetorical coercion in the context of
institutional adaption is an important strategy for rising
powers that warrants an analysis in its own right. Our aim is
therefore to present and examine an argument as to why
the G4’s rhetorical coercion strategy failed to provide com-
pelling justifications for their reform proposal that would
have forced their opponents to endorse a stance they were
opposed to.
In the next section, we develop our argument in more
detail. In the third section, we introduce our empirical strat-
egy and present the results of our analysis. The final section
summarizes the findings and draws some conclusions about
how and why rising powers apply rhetorical coercion in
response to power shifts.
The argument
The argument we propose in this article is that the rhetori-
cal coercion strategy the G4 have employed to claim perma-
nent membership in the Security Council has failed to talk
the P5 and a large enough segment of the UN membership
into a corner. The justifications the G4 provided for their
claims did not sufficiently resonate with the target audience,
and they did not close off routes for rebuttal for their oppo-
nents. Negotiating institutional adaptation involves coercive
threats and material incentives, but it also involves struggles
over institutional legitimacy. States cannot just state their
demands, they need to justify why their proposed institu-
tional reform is normatively appropriate: ‘(B)ehind every
claim to an issue, every demand for a settlement, is a ratio-
nale explaining why an audience should accept a particular
bargaining position as legitimate’ (Goddard, 2006, p. 41).
Rhetorical coercion is a ‘political strategy that seeks to
twist arms by twisting tongues’ (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, p.
42). It implies that political actors use language instrumen-
tally to justify their policy objectives and obtain acceptance
and support (Kruck and Zangl, this issue). By rhetorical fram-
ing, political actors seek to engage in meaning-making. If
successful, they narrow the space for contestation by closing
off routes for opponents to challenge the dominant justifica-
tions and, eventually, coerce their opponents into accep-
tance. Opponents might not be silenced altogether, but as
the rhetorical terrain is increasingly constructed in a way
that is unfavorable to them, they can at best contest the
margins but not the core of the dominant narrative (Hurd,
2005; Krebs and Jackson, 2007; McDonald and Merefield,
2010; Holland and Aaronson, 2014; Daßler et al., 2018).
Rhetorical coercion differs in important ways from princi-
pled persuasion (Kruck and Zangl, this issue; Goddard, this
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issue). Actors who craft rhetorical moves with which they
intend to get their opponents ‘rhetorically maneuvered into
a corner’ (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, p. 42) need not be con-
vinced of the justifications they publicly express. Rather,
they are strategic actors who use justifications instrumen-
tally, choosing those rhetorical devices they expect to yield
most traction – be they in line with their true motivations or
not (Schimmelfennig, 2001). Furthermore, as highlighted by
Kruck and Zangl in the Introduction to this special issue, the
purpose of rhetorical coercion is not to convince an oppo-
nent of the truth or reasonableness of one’s claims and
arrive at a consensus. The purpose is to force an opponent
into acceptance by closing off opportunities for rebuttal
even if the opponent is unconvinced of the validity of the
claims (Krebs and Jackson, 2007).
What rhetorical moves can achieve this purpose? The jus-
tifications political actors bring forward to bolster their
claims must resonate with the dominant norms and under-
standings of the relevant community. Thus, when molding
their rhetorical strategy, actors are not entirely free in linking
their arguments to whatever value judgments. Rather, to
render public opposition to their claims costly, they must
link these claims to norms and justifications that are
accepted by the relevant audience (Goddard, 2009; Daßler
et al., 2018). This is expected to work particularly well when
political actors can rhetorically entrap their opponents, that
is, when they are able to publicly expose their opponents’
failure to live up to self-proclaimed normative convictions
(Goddard, 2009; Lyall, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2001). Rhetori-
cal coercion is unlikely to work if ‘the structures of discourse
. . . are relatively loose (and permissive)’ (Krebs and Jackson
2007, p. 57). Hence, when there is little agreement on what
compelling norms a given community shares, rhetorical
coercion is unlikely to have the intended effect of foreclos-
ing alternative rhetorical routes and extorting support.
In the context of Security Council reform, the G4 apply a
rhetorical coercion strategy if they provide public justifica-
tions for their demand to become permanent Council mem-
bers in the relevant debates in the GA, drawing on widely
shared norms that are difficult to rebut publicly. Thus, to win
over UN member states, the G4 need to offer acceptable justi-
fications. This presupposes enough UN member states with
no self-serving interest in Security Council reform (i.e. no aspi-
rations for permanent membership or wish to resist a regional
hegemon). It also presupposes that the preferences of UN
members are not fixed so that member states can be won
over (O’Mahoney, 2017) – as is testified, for instance, by the
varying number of supporters of the G4 and their regional riv-
als over time (Swart, 2013). Moreover, it is important to note
that it is not so much the speakers representing their coun-
tries in the GA who need to be rhetorically outmaneuvered,
as these rarely enjoy sufficient leeway from their superiors in
their capitals, but rather the higher policy-making echelons in
UN member states’ capitals. The debate in the GA is therefore
primarily to be seen as the focal point of a broader debate in
which the latter are the G4’s main target audience.
If there is an audience to be won over, and if justifications
matter, what makes for a good justification? Krebs and
Jackson (2007, p. 48), as well as others, do not spell out
which specific justifications appeal to publics and why, but
they make the general argument that rhetorical coercion is
more likely to be successful if claimants can refer to ‘existing
commonplaces that represent the boundaries of legitimate
framing’. Building on extant scholarship, we propose two
main grounds of legitimacy for international institutions that
the G4 may use to justify their proposal: good performance
and fair procedures (input and output legitimacy, see e.g.,
Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Scharpf, 1999; Tallberg and
Verhaegen, this issue).2.
While scholars typically argue that both grounds matter
(Dellmuth et al., 2019), the dominant view has traditionally
been that the legitimacy of international institutions
depends primarily on their performance. Accordingly, an
institution’s legitimacy stems from its ability to enhance the
common welfare of a given community by effectively solv-
ing problems in need of collective solutions (Scharpf, 1999).
Institutions are created with a specific aim. If they do not
fulfill their purpose, they lose legitimacy. Some proponents
of this view argue that performance is the most important,
if not the only, source of legitimacy for international institu-
tions (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Gutner and Thompson,
2010).
That the legitimacy of and support for governments and
other domestic institutions depend on their ability to gener-
ate favorable outcomes, has been supported by decades of
political science research (for an overview see Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier, 2000). Recent research on international insti-
tutions also shows that performance is an important driver
of their legitimacy (e.g., Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015).
Drawing from social psychology, we suggest that fair and
democratic procedures are a more suitable justification for
legitimate international institutions than often claimed.
Social psychologists have pointed out that fair procedures
matter in various ways. From an instrumental process con-
trol perspective, fair procedures provide actors with voice
and give them the opportunity to introduce inputs into the
decision-making process (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Social
identity theory argues that actors value fair procedures
because they allow them to construct their identity as
respected and equal members of a community and extend
to them self-esteem and prestige (Lind and Tyler, 1988). Fair
procedures also serve as heuristic for actors who are uncer-
tain about decisional outcomes they receive from institu-
tions. Accordingly, actors use information about the fairness
of procedures to evaluate decisional outcomes and the
trustworthiness of decision-makers (Van den Bos et al., 1998;
see also Bøggild and Petersen, 2016).
A large body of research has shown that actors and institu-
tions – such as the police or courts – that meet standards of
procedural legitimacy are more likely to be accepted and
complied with by their addressees (Levi et al., 2009; Murphy,
2017; Tyler, 2006). A key finding in social psychology is that
fair procedures can compensate for weak performance (Brock-
ner and Wiesenfeld, 2005). Scholars have also suggested that
procedures are more important than performance showing
that dramatic improvements in the performance of the police
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in the United States (US) has not entailed increases in support
for their work, as legitimacy and support depended on the
procedural fairness of police work (Tyler, 2006). While the
social psychological mechanism of procedural fairness has
not been investigated with regard to international institu-
tions, international relations scholars have observed the rise
of a global norm of democratic governance (Dingwerth et al.,
2019) that has affected the design of international institutions,
leading to the creation of information sharing structures
(Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2018), civil society participation (Tallberg
et al., 2013) and the establishment of parliamentary bodies
(Rocabert et al., 2019). Studies have also shown that proce-
dures are an important if not the most important source of
legitimacy of international institutions for states (Binder and
Heupel, 2015) and citizens (Dellmuth et al., 2019).
We argue that the suitability of references to fair and
democratic procedures as legitimation devices for interna-
tional institutions can also help explain the failure of the G4
to legitimate their proposal for Security Council reform and
apply an effective rhetorical coercion strategy. As we show
below, the G4 have pursued a rhetorical coercion strategy
that puts strong justificatory emphasis on performance-
based claims about how the G4’s economic and political
weight as well as their material contributions to the UN
would enhance the Council’s effectiveness in addressing
international security threats and would improve compli-
ance with Council decisions. The G4 have also justified their
proposal in terms of increased representation, but they have
put far less emphasis on procedural grounds. While some
UN member states have expressed acceptance of the G4’s
performance justifications, the performance argument was
not strong enough to close off routes for rebuttal. The G4’s
rivals have opted for making justificatory claims of a type
that was less favorable to the G4 – namely claims about
procedural fairness. UN member states that rejected the G4
proposal, or came forward with competing proposals, not
only justified their rejection or their alternative proposals
overwhelmingly in procedural terms. They also managed to
rebut the G4 claims of enhanced representation so as to
advance their own procedural justifications – accountability,
transparency, regional rotation and better representation of
African states – that finally won broader rhetorical support.
The next section provides empirical evidence for this claim.
Empirical analysis
Data and operationalization
To empirically substantiate our argument, we analyze the
2005 UNGA debate on Security Council reform in which the
G4 presented their proposal in the form of a draft resolu-
tion. As a response, two groups, namely the Uniting for Con-
sensus (UfC) group and the African Group, submitted rival
proposals, also as draft resolutions. This debate is particu-
larly useful for our purpose. The GA is the main forum in
which states address common issues ‘in ways that legitimate
or delegitimate state conduct’ (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, p.
24). The 2005 debate has so far been the key debate on
Security Council reform, as an important window of oppor-
tunity had opened prior to the UN World summit in the
autumn of that year (Von Freiesleben, 2013). Furthermore,
the debate is particularly insightful as the G4 and their com-
petitors not only justify their reform proposals, but UN
member states also state whether they accept or reject
those justifications as legitimate, and why. Thus, the debate
provides us with an opportunity to observe how norms
compete with each other as actors try to make them focal,
and how some norms prevail while others do not (see Rost
Rublee, 2009). Of course, we cannot know whether the
expressed justifications of UN member states are sincere in
that states truly believe in the importance of institutional
performance or democratic procedures of the Council, or
whether they justify their support for or opposition to a pro-
posal because they believe their justifications resonate with
the relevant audience. This is less of a problem, however,
because rhetorical coercion does not require actors to
believe in what they say or persuade each other, but to be
able to rhetorically outmaneuver their opponents.
From 11–26 July 2005, the GA held a debate on the Ques-
tion of equitable representation on and increase in the mem-
bership of the Security Council and related matters in which
UN member states discussed the draft resolution that the
G4 (along with its co-sponsors) had submitted on 6 July.3.
The proposal envisaged an expansion of the Council by add-
ing six permanent seats – four for the G4 plus two for Afri-
can states – and four non-permanent seats – one for Asia,
Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe, respectively. Origi-
nally, the G4 had demanded to extend the veto right to the
new permanent members, but they accepted to forego this
for at least 15 years. The G4 proposal also provided for a set
of improvements of the Council working methods – ranging
from open Council meetings to timely consultations with
troop contributing countries, submitting special reports to
the GA and a review of the amendments after 15 years.
To investigate our claim that the G4 failed to apply a
rhetorical strategy that would have coerced the P5 and two
thirds of the UN membership to support their reform pro-
posal, we assess for each state that participated in the
debate (altogether 52 states),4. whether it justified its posi-
tion on the proposal with reference to performance- or pro-
cedures-based arguments, or by referring to both grounds
of legitimacy equally.5. Performance-based arguments refer
to the implications of the proposed reform for the Council’s
ability to adopt resolutions, ensure compliance with and
implementation of its decisions, remain committed to the
issues on its agenda, and to generally fulfill its mandate.
Thus, critics of the reform proposal could, for instance, warn
that the G4’s reform proposal might complicate Council
decision-making as it increases the number of veto players,
while the G4 might justify their proposal arguing that their
resources would help secure implementation of the Coun-
cil’s decisions. Procedures-based arguments, by contrast,
refer to implications of the proposed reform for the Coun-
cil’s representativeness, its working methods, its accountabil-
ity provisions, and the sovereign equality of UN member
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states. Accordingly, the G4 might justify their proposal
claiming that it enhances the representation of states of the
global South in the Council, while critics might reject the
proposal arguing that the proposed reforms to the Council’s
accountability provisions amount to nothing more than win-
dow-dressing. Sometimes, speakers combine elements of
performance- and procedures-based arguments in one argu-
ment, for example, when they assert that improvements to
the Council’s procedures will have a positive effect on the
Council’s performance. If an argument displays this pattern,
we count the argument as a mixed argument.
Finally, when assessing whether speakers provide pre-
dominantly performance- or procedures-based justifications,
or both types of justifications in equal measure, we primarily
take into account how much time (or space, in the debate’s
transcripts) speakers devoted to each type of argument. In
cases in which this criterion proves inconclusive, we also
consider the emphasis put on each type of argument, taking
both direct and indirect forms of emphasis into account.6.
We provide examples of coded statements as well as a sum-
mary of the results in the online appendix.
Brazil, Germany, India, Japan
All four G4 members justified their reform proposal mostly
with performance-based arguments. Brazil and Japan put a
strong emphasis on that the proposal would improve the
Council’s performance. Brazil introduced the draft resolution
and started out by arguing that the current international secu-
rity structure built around the UN Security Council was ‘glar-
ingly outdated’. Specifically, it pointed to a ‘sense of urgency
in promoting the Organization’s effectiveness in all areas, par-
ticularly in the field of the maintenance of peace and security’
and argued that reform was needed for the Council to ‘effec-
tively carry out its functions and exercise its powers’. Subse-
quently, Brazil also asserted that ‘(i)t is clear that the Council’s
future effectiveness is also contingent upon the permanent
presence of major financial contributors and those who are
most willing and able to contribute to the work of the United
Nations’.7. Finally, it emphasized that Council reform would
lead to ‘more systematic and effective compliance with the
Council’s decisions’.8. Japan replicated Brazil’s performance-
based arguments. Only once did it point to improving the
Council’s representativeness.9. Other than that, Japan argued
that the Council ‘must be provided with adequate resources
to address challenges effectively’, and that ‘[c]ountries with
the will and resources to play a major role in international
peace and security must always take part in the Council’s
decision-making process’.10. It also maintained that perma-
nent membership was not a privilege but a ‘duty and respon-
sibility for nations that are willing and able to contribute
effectively to international peace and security’.11.
Germany and India put an, albeit less pronounced,
emphasis on performance-based arguments, too. Germany
claimed that the G4 proposal ‘would strengthen the prob-
lem-solving capacity of the Security Council’, which ‘would
be in the interests of everyone’.12. Germany also emphasized
that ‘reform of the Council would strengthen the United
Nations and its ability to address the threats and challenges
of the twenty-first century’.13. And, responding to criticism
that was levelled against the G4 during the debate, Ger-
many argued that the suggested expansion of the Council
to 25 members would not undermine but strengthen the
body’s effectiveness. Germany argued that ‘some of those
who oppose expanding the Council to 25 members . . .
would certainly disagree with the notion that the NATO
Council has become less effective since it was expanded to
26 members’.14. At the same time, Germany justified the
proposal also with reference to its suggested procedural
improvements, pointing out that it would include a reform
of the Council’s working methods and would give UN mem-
ber states a ‘tool to review the Council’s composition’.15.
India had not planned to contribute to the debate, but
decided to intervene to basically rail against states that had
voiced opposition. India justified the proposal only briefly in
terms of both grounds of legitimacy, arguing among others
that the proposed review clause would make it possible to
hold permanent members ‘accountable for their perfor-
mance’16. and that a more representative Council would
‘reach decisions acceptable to the broad majority of the
general membership’.17.
Overall, the G4 put strong emphasis on enhanced Council
performance. The group focused its rhetorical strategy on
how the G4’s economic power and material contributions to
the UN would make a difference to the Council’s effective-
ness and compliance with its decisions, and less on how the
reform would improve the quality of the Council’s proce-
dures. To what extent were the targeted audiences rhetori-
cally coerced to express acceptance?
The permanent members
As noted, any Security Council reform requires the support
(or at least the acquiescence) of all five permanent mem-
bers. Two permanent members – France and United King-
dom (UK) – publicly supported the G4 proposal in the
debate and even acted as co-sponsors of the draft resolu-
tion, though some suspect that they supported the resolu-
tion in order to stifle demands for a common European
Union seat (Stedman, 2007). France expressed acceptance of
the G4’s performance-based justifications, highlighting that
the growing ‘list of crises on the Council’s agenda’ made it
essential ‘that we enhance the Council’s effectiveness’ by
extending membership ‘to other Powers that can make a
major contribution to international peace and security’.18.
The UK put more emphasis on procedural justifications,
underlining that an enlarged Council would be more repre-
sentative and that the UK wanted a more ‘transparent’
Council and one that ‘consults more effectively with the
wider membership’.19. The UK also expressed its reservations
about the veto right for new permanent members. Perfor-
mance-based justifications figured prominently in the UK’s
statements as well: A reformed Council would ‘revitalize’ the
UN by making its organs ‘capable of delivering’.20.
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The US, China and Russia rejected the G4 proposal. The US
publicly supported a permanent seat for Japan and India, but
was unwilling to concede a permanent seat to Germany in
light of the controversy over the invasion of Iraq two years
earlier (Stedman, 2007). Like the G4, the US used perfor-
mance-based arguments to defend its position. It made clear
it supported a reform that would make the Council ‘more
effective’ in confronting security challenges that could only
be addressed ‘by active, effective, multilateral institutions’.
However, it expressed its staunch opposition against the G4
proposal as it ‘would make the Council less effective than it is
today’, warning that an expansion must not make the Council
‘so large that it becomes ineffective’.21. China, in contrast,
rejected the G4 proposal with reference to its failure to con-
vincingly address shortcomings to the Council’s procedures. It
argued that the Council needed to give voice to developing
countries that are ‘seriously underrepresented on the Security
Council’.22. Russia’s rhetorical strategy occupied a middle
ground, with Russia substantiating its rejection with perfor-
mance-based and procedural arguments. Russia underlined
that Council reform should produce a ‘more balanced Council
membership by including major and influential developing
countries’, while cautioning that making the Council ‘more
representative must not undermine its effectiveness’.23. Thus,
neither China nor Russia opted for a rhetorical strategy that
would have challenged the G4 on the rhetorical terrain of per-
formance legitimacy chosen by the G4.
Taken together, the G4 have failed to rhetorically coerce
the P5 as a group into publicly supporting their reform pro-
posal. The G4’s two supporters – France and UK – echoed
the G4’s performance-based justifications, but, in the case of
the UK, also voiced procedural justifications for their sup-
port. Among the remaining P5 members opposing their pro-
posal, the G4’s performance-based arguments were not met
with approval. Either opponents uttered procedural justifica-
tions to reject the G4 proposal, or, if they treated perfor-
mance as a valid criterion for judging the reform proposal,
they turned the G4’s argument around, claiming that the
proposed extension to 25 members would make the Council
less effective.
The wider UN membership
The P5 are just one audience of the G4’s rhetorical coercion
strategy, the second – arguably more important one – being
the wider UN membership. The G4 argued that the support
of two thirds of UN member states for their proposal would
make it politically very difficult for the P5 to put in a veto.
This is precisely what had happened in 1965 when the per-
manent members were opposed to the extension of Council
membership from six to ten non-permanent seats but ulti-
mately had to give in, in light of strong support for Security
Council reform in the GA (Von Freiesleben, 2013). After all,
the Security Council has value for the P5 only to the extent
that the UN membership accepts its authority. To what
extent did UN member states express support for the G4
proposal, and based on what justifications?
Of the supporters, 18 of the 52 states participating in the
debate expressed support for the G4’s proposal.24. Among
these, one third primarily echoed the G4’ performance-
based justifications, one third made performance- and pro-
cedures-based arguments in equal measure, and one third
made predominantly procedural arguments. Belgium, Czech
Republic, Latvia, Palau, Samoa and Ukraine rhetorically
endorsed the G4’s performance-based arguments.25. Bel-
gium, for example, said that ‘one may wonder why a coun-
try such as Belgium would support the creation of new
permanent seats. Quite simply, we believe that the presence
of permanent members makes the Council effective in
managing issues affecting international peace and secu-
rity’.26. Denmark, Fiji, Greece, Lithuania, Poland and Tuvalu
also voiced support for the G4 proposal, but provided per-
formance- and procedures-based justifications even-hand-
edly.27. Poland stated, for instance, that ‘what we need is a
stronger and more efficient Security Council – a Council
which is able to take decisions and has the authority to
ensure that they are fully implemented’ and that it accepted
‘the aspirations of those countries that make important con-
tributions to the United Nations system’.28. But Poland also
put strong emphasis on the procedural aspects of the pro-
posal, underlining that a more representative Council would
adopt more legitimate and effectively implemented deci-
sions.29. Bhutan, Haiti, Iceland, Jordan, Norway, and Portugal
supported the draft, too, but they justified their support pre-
dominantly by picking up the few procedural arguments the
G4 had offered.30. Iceland, for example, justified its support
by strongly emphasizing better representation for African
and small states and proposed improvements of the Coun-
cil’s working methods.31.
Overall, the G4’s performance-based justifications res-
onated with a number of UN member states. Roughly one
third of the states backing the G4 proposal justified their
support in terms of increased performance, and a similar
share of supporters employed performance and procedures-
based justifications in equal measure. However, even within
the group of supporters, traction of performance-based
arguments was limited in that the remaining third mostly
opted for procedural arguments.
Of the opponents, 22 states rejected the G4 reform pro-
posal. Some states, or groups of states, even put forward
competing reform plans. One such group was the UfC
group. The UfC comprises regional rivals of the G4, namely
Argentina, Italy, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea, but it
also includes Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico,
San Marina and Turkey, and thus states that have no obvi-
ous regional power aspirations nor any ambition for a per-
manent seat. The African Group, composed of African Union
members, came up with a counter-proposal as well. Finally,
also a number of unaffiliated states were opposed to the G4
proposal. The vast majority of the G4’s opponents ignored
or openly rejected the G4’s performance-based justification
and they overwhelmingly justified their opposition to the
G4 proposal or their competing proposals in procedural
terms.
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In response to the G4 draft resolution, the UfC group
tabled a competing draft resolution that envisaged to
expanding the Council to 25 members (20 of them non-per-
manent) and to distributing the elected seats evenly among
the regions, leaving it to each region to select candidates.32.
Most UfC members criticized the G4 proposal and justified
their own counter-proposal invoking procedural grounds.
Canada, for instance, justified its rejection with ‘the emer-
gence of values that are now fostered and cherished here
and throughout the world: values such as democracy,
accountability, flexibility and fairness – values that do not
favour a widened notion of two-tiered privileges’. It added
that ‘the Council of 1945 must be seen as an anomaly to be
accommodated, not as a model to be emulated’.33. The UfC
proposal, by contrast, would make the Council accountable
(‘Permanence is the polar opposite of accountability’) and
fair.34. Canada did not make any mention of improved
Council performance as an objective of the UfC proposal.
Pakistan, with Italy the main protagonist of the group,
accused the G4 of seeking ‘new and unequal privileges for
themselves’.35. ‘To add insult to injury’, Pakistan complained,
‘self-interest has been portrayed as altruism. The seekers of
special privileges and power masquerade as the champions
of the weak and the disadvantaged’. Pakistan also lamented
that the G4 proposal ‘would erode, not enhance, democracy
and accountability in the Security Council’.36. Instead, Pak-
istan argued, the UfC proposal was ‘fair and equitable’,
would increase the Council’s ‘representativeness’ and ‘en-
hance accountability, through the mechanism of periodic
elections and re-elections’.37. Like Canada, Pakistan did not
justify the UfC proposal in terms of enhanced effectiveness.
Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Mexico, Spain and Turkey also
justified both their rejection of the G4 proposal and their
support for the UfC proposal strongly in procedural terms.38.
Argentina, Republic of Korea and San Marino used procedu-
ral and performance-based arguments in equal measure. No
UfC member made primarily performance-based arguments
to criticize the G4 proposal or justify their own counter-pro-
posal.39.
The African Group also rejected the G4 bid and presented
its own rival proposal.40. Like the G4, the African Group
demanded an enlargement in both membership categories.
They were massively wooed by the G4 and at times it
seemed as if some African states would break rank with the
African Group (Von Freisesleben, 2013). However, the African
Group put strong emphasis on the fact that Africa was the
only region not being represented through a permanent
seat on the Council. The African Group called for two per-
manent seats with the right of veto and five non-permanent
Council seats for African states. It was deeply divided, how-
ever, about which states should obtain the permanent seats.
The rhetorical strategy chosen by African Group members to
justify the rejection of the G4 proposal and advertise their
own proposal was strikingly similar to that of the UfC, with
most countries making predominantly procedural argu-
ments, a small subset of countries making procedural and
performance-based arguments in roughly equal measure,
and no country privileging performance-based arguments.
Among the six states that spoke on behalf of the group,
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritius and South Africa put strong
emphasis on procedural justifications.41. South Africa, for
instance, did not refer to performance at all, arguing instead
that the African Group proposal would make the Council
more transparent, accountable and representative, which
was especially important given that African states were a
frequent target of Council action.42. Egypt and Nigeria justi-
fied their position by making procedural claims, too, but
they added performance-based claims.43. Nigeria, for exam-
ple, argued that the proposed new distribution of seats
‘should ensure greater representation of the developing
countries, whilst taking account of some key players with
significant contributions to make to the advancement of the
goals and objectives of the United Nations’.44.
Finally, the G4 proposal was also rejected by five unaffili-
ated UN member states. If treated as a group, these states
displayed the same rhetorical justificatory pattern as the UfC
and the African Group: Four states predominantly used pro-
cedural arguments, with Indonesia warning of an ‘underrep-
resentation for Asia’,45. New Zealand and Uruguay
demanding stronger accountability,46. and Switzerland pro-
moting a proposal that focused on improved working meth-
ods.47. Only the Netherlands made equally procedural and
performance-based arguments, acknowledging that the G4
were ‘capable of . . . shouldering the extra burden of pro-
moting global security’, whilst opposing the extension of
the veto right.48.
We can summarize our findings as follows: The G4 have
justified their Security Council reform proposal strongly in
terms of improving the Council’s performance and less so in
terms of procedural fairness. While some UN members
expressed acceptance of the performance argument, it was
not strong enough a justification. The opponents of the G4
focused mostly on procedural legitimacy and therefore situ-
ated the debate on a legitimatory terrain that was less
favorable to the G4. The G4’s main procedural justification
was increased representation, a weak point given that add-
ing states like Germany and Japan to the permanent mem-
bers does not do much to increase the Council’s
representativeness. The opponents of the G4 rejected the
G4 proposal mostly in procedural terms, putting much more
emphasis on enhancing the fairness and democratic quality
of the Council’s procedures. They criticized the veto right for
new permanent members, advocated a regular, binding
review mechanism to ensure the accountability of new per-
manent members, and demanded further improvements of
the Council’s working methods. In terms of representation,
most states advocated the inclusion of developing countries,
in particular African states, or regional rotation of non-per-
manent members.
Brazil, Germany, India and Japan’s strategy of rhetorical
coercion thus failed to limit the space for contestation. As
noted, rhetorical coercion depends on an agreement on
what norms are valid and what the dominant norms in a
community are (Krebs and Jackson, 2007; Goddard, 2009).
However, there is no consensus among states as to whether
the legitimacy of international institutions rather derives
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from performance or procedural fairness. Rather, one legiti-
matory standard enjoys greater acceptance among UN
member states – but it is procedural fairness and not institu-
tional performance, as the G4’ rhetorical strategy would
have suggested and as most accounts of the legitimation of
international institutions assume. As the G4’s opponents
used the available rhetorical space to focus the discourse
not on the issue of performance but on procedural fairness,
the G4 was deprived of the opportunity to rhetorically
entrap their opponents by pointing out that their opponents
had likewise previously called for improvements to the
Council’s performance. If anything, it was the G4’s critics
that managed to capitalize on rhetorical traps, as the G4 felt
the need to justify their proposal in terms of procedural fair-
ness and especially representativeness – which opened the
door for their opponents to rebut the G4 proposal on proce-
dural grounds. This did not mean that either the UfC or the
African Group would have been able to round up sufficient
support for their own reform proposal – as this would have
at least required both groups to agree on a common pro-
posal.49. Yet, it entailed that the G4’s rhetorical coercion
strategy fell through.
Conclusion
This article sought to contribute to the framework outlined
in the Introduction to this special issue (Kruck and Zangl,
this issue) by looking at a strategy of institutional change
available to rising powers that has so far received little
attention – rhetorical coercion (see also Fioretos, this issue;
Goddard, this issue; MacDonald, this issue). Focusing on the
debate about UN Security Council reform, we have shown
that debates about institutional reform involve struggles
over legitimacy. The G4 have lost this struggle over legiti-
macy because their rhetorical strategy was unsuccessful in
closing off the possibility of justifiable rebuttal for their
opponents.
Since 2005, the debate on Security Council reform in the
GA has dragged along. Yet, there is little indication that the
G4 have significantly changed their rhetorical strategy. For
instance, in the latest debate in 2018, G4 members acknowl-
edge the benefits of greater representativeness, but they
continue to justify their reform proposal mainly with perfor-
mance-based arguments. At the same time, frustrated with
the delay of the opening of text-based negotiations, the G4
meanwhile increasingly focus on making proposals as to
how to get such negotiations started, rather than providing
justifications for the reform proposal itself.50. Hence, with
the window of opportunity from 2005 closed, momentum is
being lost for the G4 to apply a strategy of rhetorical coer-
cion to bolster their claim to Security Council reform. If a
new window opens, for instance at the beginning of text-
based negotiations, we should, however, again observe the
group devise such a strategy in an effort to make their
opponents publicly endorse their position.
Our analysis has implications for how and why rising pow-
ers apply rhetorical coercion in response to power shifts and
suggests avenues for future research. First, our results
suggest that a rhetorical coercion strategy that strongly
relies on performance-based justifications is unlikely to res-
onate among relevant audiences whose acceptance of insti-
tutional adaptations is required. Rather, because such
justifications do not effectively narrow the space for contes-
tation, targeted audiences can rebut the justifications by
drawing on procedural arguments. Recent scholarship finds
that procedural fairness has become the dominant legitima-
tion standard for international organizations (IOs) (Dellmuth
et al., 2019; Dingwerth et al., 2019), giving us reason to
believe that this finding applies to struggles over institu-
tional adaptation in other IOs. However, the importance
many states put on procedural fairness might also be due
to the peculiarities of the Security Council, such as its vast
power and symbolic value. Future research should therefore
examine similar reform debates in other IOs to learn more
about how rhetorical coercion is applied by rising powers.
Second, rhetoric is not endlessly malleable. For the G4 it
would have been rational to devise a rhetorical coercion
strategy composed primarily of procedures-based argu-
ments. The G4 used procedures-based justifications, but
they mostly made performance-based arguments even
though they were widely rejected – and, as the reference to
the 2018 debate above suggests, they stuck to this rhetori-
cal pattern for years. One explanation could be that the G4
did not know about other states’ concerns or that they did
not really listen during the debates, which is not very plausi-
ble.51. This suggests that rhetorical coercion is unlikely to
succeed as a strategy of institutional adaptation if the pro-
posed reform grants privileges to a small group of selected
states. Yet, it also suggests that rhetorical coercion might be
a more effective strategy of institutional adaptation if it is
employed by a larger and more heterogeneous group that
bids for reforms which would lead to a more equal distribu-
tion of privileges. Future research should therefore compare
the success of different types of attempts at rhetorical coer-
cion across different types of actors.
Finally, why have the G4 after 2005 stuck to a strategy
that was ineffective in that it did not sufficiently resonate
with the target audience? One possible explanation is that
the G4 cared that much about the reform and were con-
vinced of the rightfulness and importance of their claim to
an extent that giving up was simply not an option. How-
ever, the continuation of the G4’s reform campaign might
also fulfil additional functions for its members (see also Ste-
phen, 2015). The G4 might remain with their rhetorical coer-
cion strategy because it is a vehicle for them to signal to
other states that they claim great power status. They might
never be granted permanent seats, but the debate offers
them a forum to send a strong signal to the global public
that they belong to the elite club of privileged states of
high status (see Ward, 2017). At the same time, the ritual of
claiming a seat at the table and the status of a great power
might not only be outward oriented but it might also be
inward oriented. Thus, by claiming that they belong to the
inner circle of great powers and that their acceptance in this
inner circle makes a global organization like the UN perform
better, the G4 might also reassure themselves that their
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right to special entitlements is legitimate. Again, even if the
entitlements are never granted and acceptance to the inner
circle is refused, the ritual of the debate might still be valu-
able for the G4 to reassure themselves of their self-ascribed
identity as a great power that deserves privileges (see Bar-
ker, 2001). As a result, attempts at rhetorical coercion post
2005 might not lead to institutional adaption, but the mere
utterance of performance-related justifications might serve
other important functions for the G4, and, as future research
might explore, potentially other rising powers in their search
for their place in the world.
Notes
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received during the authors’ workshop at the LMU Munich’s Center
for Advanced Studies (CAS) as well as the logistical support and
generous funding Martin Binder has received from CAS for an
extended stay at LMU Munich. Open access funding enabled and
organized by Projekt DEAL.
2. These are not the only grounds of legitimacy, but arguably the
major ones. For example, Binder and Heupel (2015) add legal legiti-
macy while Tallberg and Z€urn (2019) add authority.
3. A/59/L.64.
4. Madagascar participated in the debate as well, but it did not state
its position or provide any justification.
5. Occasionally, states made additional justificatory claims, including
the upcoming UN world summit, requests by the Secretary-General
to deliver reform, or support from a heterogeneous group of states.
However, the great majority of arguments refers to either the Coun-
cil’s procedures or its performance (or both).
6. For instance, a speaker explicitly stating that she considers perfor-
mance-based arguments particularly compelling would be an exam-
ple of direct emphasis. Exposing less explicit forms of emphasis is
more challenging and requires considering each oral contribution in
its entirety. However, as a general guidance, the use of strong
adjectives and illustrative examples might be an example of indirect
emphasis, as might be the placement of an argument at the very
beginning or the very end of the statement.
7. This statement by Brazil and similar statements by other G4 mem-
bers are no attempts at strategic cooptation – an alternative mecha-
nism of institutional adaptation presented in the introduction to
this special issue – as the G4 did not make material contributions
to the Council conditional on Council reform or issue credible
threats in this regard.
8. A/59/PV.111, p. 2. To a lesser extent, Brazil also made procedural
arguments. It argued that ‘[r]epresentativeness and equitable partici-
pation must be clearly reflected in the composition of the Security
Council’. Brazil also claimed that the selection of the new perma-
nent members by the GA and the envisaged review process would
‘establish a direct link of accountability between the new perma-
nent members and the general membership’ (A/59/PV.111, p. 2).
9. A/59/PV.111, p. 4.
10. A/59/PV.111, p. 4.
11. A/59/PV.111, p. 5.
12. A/59/PV.112, p. 13.
13. A/59/PV.112, p.14.
14. A/59/PV.112, p. 13.
15. A/59/PV.112, p. 13.
16. A/59/PV.112, p. 27.
17. A/59/PV.112, p. 29.
18. A/59/PV.111, p. 11. France alluded only very briefly to improving
the Council’s representativeness by adding permanent seats for Afri-
can states.
19. A/59/PV.112, p. 19.
20. A/59/PV.112, pp. 19-20.
21. A/59/PV.112, pp. 9-10.
22. A/59/PV.111, p. 13. Some explain China’s opposition to the proposal
by its fierce resistance to Japan’s permanent membership, with
Sino-Japanese relations being particularly sour at the time.
23. A/59/PV.112, p. 8.
24. Chile, Finland and Sweden provided some rhetorical support to the
proposal, but they expressed criticism as well and fell short of
explicitly endorsing the proposal (A/59/PV/111, p. 18-19 and A/59/
PV/112, p. 6).
25. A/59/PV.111, pp. 22-23 and A/59/112, pp. 4-7, 14, 18-20, 22-23.
26. A/59/PV.112, p. 4.
27. A/59/PV.111, pp. 12-15, 19-20, 22 and A/59/PV.112, pp. 5, 16-17.
28. A/59/PV.111, p. 15.
29. A/59/PV.111, p. 15.
30. A/59/PV.111, pp. 4, 11-12, 23 and A/59/PV.112, pp. 17-18, 24-25.
31. A/59/PV.111, pp. 11-12.
32. A/59/L.68.
33. A/59/PV.112: p. 2.
34. A/59/PV.115, pp. 1-2.
35. A/59/PV.111, p. 8.
36. A/59/PV.111, p. 8. Pakistan mentioned performance only once,
claiming that the G4 proposal would ‘reduce, not improve, the
effectiveness and the efficiency of the Security Council by requiring
the constant reconciliation of the interests of 11, instead of 5, per-
manent members’ (A/59/PV.111, p. 8).
37. A/59/PV.115, p. 6.
38. A/59/PV.111, p. 17, A/59/PV.112, pp. 14, 21-22, 25 and A/59/PV.115,
pp. 3-5.
39. A/59/PV.111, pp. 15, 19 and A/59/PV.112, pp. 10-12.
40. A/59/L.67, co-sponsored by 44 African states.
41. A/59/PV.111, pp. 6-7, 12, A/59/PV.112, p. 30 and A/59/PV.114, pp. 4-
6.
42. A/59/PV.114, p. 5.
43. A/59/PV.114, pp. 1-4.
44. A/59/PV.114, p. 2.
45. A/59/PV.112: p. 21.
46. A/59/PV.112, p. 3.
47. A/59/PV.111, p. 21.
48. A/59/PV.112, p. 8.
49. That the UfC and the African Group failed to agree on a common
reform proposal suggests that both groups were primarily inter-
ested in obstructing the G4 reform bid rather than getting a reform
proposal through that would have required substantial compromise
(e.g. Swart, 2013) – and that they thus behaved akin to Bloomfield
and Scott’s (2017, p. 3) ‘creative resisters’ who may use ‘delaying
tactics to . . . sap the momentum for change’.
50. A/73/PV.36: pp. 8-9, 16-17, 21-11 and A/73/PV.37, pp. 18-19.
51. See, for instance, the following statement by Pakistan: ‘The views of
Pakistan and other Uniting for Consensus members on draft resolu-
tion A/59/L.64 is no secret. We oppose it for several reasons.’ –
which is followed by a long list of mostly procedures-based argu-
ments (A/59/PV.111, pp. 8-9).
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